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ABSTRACT 
In order to evaluate a fiscal common-pool problem, this paper focuses on the relationship 
between local government council size and its expenditure. Generally, local councilors 
internalize the benefit of public projects targeted at their political jurisdictions, but 
underestimate and prefer to externalize the cost of public projects due to the national subsidy 
system. When council sizes become larger, their expenditure might be larger because of the 
selfish behavior of local council members. 
This paper estimates the positive effect of local council size on local government expenditure 
using a dataset of 13,989 municipalities in Japan over a period of 6 years. In Japan, local council 
size is a deterministic and discontinuous function of municipal population size under legal rules. 
We pay attention to this exogenous discontinuity and apply a regression discontinuity design to 
consider an endogeneity bias. The results show that the larger the size of the local council the 
larger the size of expenditure they undertake. In particular, we find that growing small 
municipalities tend to increase their expenditures, so that for example, 1% increases in local 
council size lead to about 1.2% increases of expenditures by small municipalities. Our results 
show that the fiscal common-pool problem is produced in small municipalities. 
Keywords: fiscal common-pool problem, local council size, government expenditure, regression 
discontinuity design 
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1. Introduction 
Japan has suffered from several fiscal problems, particularly in local government, where 
deficits have become large. With the advance of decentralization, the role of the local 
government has become increasingly important, and there has been active promotion of 
government reform. 
In political economics, government expenditure and fiscal deficit are affected by political 
effect.
1
 A growing fiscal deficit is caused by political institutional problems. The fiscal 
common-pool problem relates to the free rider problem, pork-barrel spending, and law of 1/n, 
which are all very similar phenomena. Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) formalized the 
fiscal common-pool problem.
2
 For example, consider the situation in which there are some 
districts that receive most of the marginal benefits from public projects, while marginal costs are 
paid by all districts. The financial resources of public projects are covered across the districts. 
Local politicians internalize the benefit of public projects targeting their own specific political 
districts. They also underestimate and prefer to externalize the cost of public projects due to the 
debt issue or national subsidy system (see e.g., Bradbury and Crain, 2001; Bessho, 2010). 
The degree of the fiscal common-pool problem depends on government fragmentation. 
Fragmentation of the policy decision-making process is closely related to the notion of 
internalization of the costs of fiscal policy. There are two types of fragmentation: legislative and 
executive. Legislative fragmentation depends on the number of ruling party members. The 
greater the number of ruling party members, the larger is the difficulty in harmonizing their 
interests, and that increases adjustment costs. As a result, expanding the number of parties in a 
coalition increases government expenditure and fiscal deficits. Alesina and Perotti (1995) 
showed that the reduction of fiscal deficits of coalition parties is lower than that of single parties 
in OECD 20 countries. The latter indicates executive fragmentation. The point is the number of 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Acemoglu (2005), Kirchgässner (2002), Persson and Tabellini (2000). 
2
 von Hagen (2006) reviewed theoretical and empirical research about the fiscal common-pool problem. 
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spending ministers (cabinet size). The expansion of cabinet size tends to increase government 
expenditure and fiscal deficits. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) show how fiscal deficits are 
influenced by executive fragmentation in OECD 20 countries. The number of spending 
ministers has strong and robust effects on the level of government expenditure. The number of 
parties in the coalition also has a statistically significant association with government 
expenditure. Schaltegger and Feld (2009) show how larger cabinets are positively related to 
larger government expenditure in Swiss cantons. Their research showed how the fiscal 
common-pool problem depends on the structure of fiscal institutions. 
In addition, council and government size are discussed by Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995, 
2001), Persson and Tabellini (1999), Bradbury and Crain (2001), Baqir (2002), Bradbury and 
Stephenson (2003), Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2011). When 
council size increases, expenditure will be larger because each politician tends to bring benefits 
to his/her own political district. The size of government is positively related to the number of 
council members. The phenomenon is also referred to as a fiscal common-pool problem. 
Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995, 2001) found a positive relationship between legislature size and 
expenditure in upper chambers of American state legislatures.
3
 Bradbury and Crain (2001) 
showed the positive relationship between legislative size and government expenditure across 
countries in data from OECD countries. However, there is a greater effect in single than in two 
chambers. Bradbury and Stephenson (2003) used both state and national level data from the U.S. 
They also showed the positive relationship between legislative size and local government 
expenditure. Examining both the U.S.’s state and city data, Baqir (2002) found the increase of 
the number of a city’s council members tends to increase per capita local government 
expenditure. An estimate for the elasticity of government size with respect to the number of 
districts is 0.11. Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) showed evidence for a positive effect of 
council size on government expenditure using panel data from municipalities in the German 
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 However, lower chamber size has no council size effect on expenditure. 
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state of Bavaria. In contrast, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) showed evidence for a negative effect of 
council size on government expenditure in both Finland’s and Sweden’s municipalities. These 
results of previous research are in conflict. Therefore, we analyze the relationship between 
council size and government size in Japan.
4
 
In order to determine if there is a fiscal common-pool problem, this paper focuses on the 
relationship between council size and government expenditure using a dataset of 13,989 
municipalities in Japan over a period of 6 years. In Japan, the size of local councils is by law a 
deterministic and discontinuous function of municipal populations. We address this exogenous 
discontinuity and apply a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to consider an endogeneity bias. 
The results indicate that the larger the size of the local council drives the size of expenditure. In 
particular, we find that small municipalities tend to increase their expenditure more than large 
municipalities, such that 1% increases in local council size lead to about 1.2% increases of 
expenditure in small municipalities. Thus, our results show that small municipalities induce the 
fiscal common-pool problem. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses Japanese local councils. 
Sections 3 and 4 define the empirical model. Section 5 provides the results of the RDD 
estimation. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Background to Japanese local councils 
There are three layers of government structures in Japan: central, prefectural, and municipal. 
The local government involves prefectures and municipalities (cities, towns, and villages). 
There are about 3,000 municipalities in Japan. Local government plays an important role in 
providing public services, including public welfare and health, school education, police and fire 
services, and public works such as roads and sewage systems, etc. The ratio of GDP consisting 
of Japanese local public finance is about 12%. This amount is about 2.5 times that of the central 
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 Hirota and Yunoue (2011) showed that the expenditure of the local council is positively related to the number of 
council members. 
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government. Additionally, local tax resources are about 35% of the total revenues in 
municipalities. The total debt of municipalities was about 9.6% of municipal revenues of 53,854 
billion yen at the end of FY2010. 
We briefly explain the system of the Japanese local government and council within 
municipalities. There is a dual representation system in the Japanese local government and local 
council. It means the mayor and council members are directly elected as representative organs 
by voters in a public election that is held every four years. In Japan, being a local council 
member is a full-time job. Voters provide their requests by petition and lobbying. Moreover, the 
local government provides public services to voters and submits proposed budgets to local 
council members who determine local government budgets. They also monitor local government 
spending. Local council members have veto powers over local government spending, such as 
proposed budget amendments. Table 1 shows the upper limit of the local council size depending 
on the size of the municipal population under the law of council size (Local Autonomy Act, 
Article 91). There are six thresholds deciding city size. The Act prescribes a maximum council 
size in relation to a city’s population size. The number of local council members might reach the 
upper limit in many cases. For example, if the population size is less than 50,000, then the 
number of council members should be at most 26. If the population size is more than 50,000 and 
less than 100,000, then the number of council members should be at most 30 and so on. There are 
exceptions for large cities with population sizes of 900,000. For those large cities, the maximum 
limit of the number of local council members can be increased by eight members for each 
increase of 500,000 in its population size. For example, if the population size is 1,400,000 
(900,000 plus 500,000), the upper limit of the local council size is 64 (56 plus 8). 
As in the case of cities, each town and village’s maximum council size is also prescribed in 
relation to the population size by the law concerning local council size. On the right hand side of 
Table 1, there are four thresholds for towns and villages: 2,001, 5001, 10,001, and 20,001. If the 
population size is more than 2,000 and less than 5,000, the number of council members is 14. 
Therefore, there are 10 thresholds under Japanese municipal law. 
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3. Empirical framework 
This paper analyzes the relationship between the local council size and local government size. 
We use regression discontinuity design (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Imbens and Lemieux, 2007; 
Lee and Lemieux, 2010). As required by law, Japan’s local council size is a deterministic and 
discontinuous function of the municipal population size. Council law prescribes a maximum 
limit of the council size in relation to the population size. As we explained earlier, there are 10 
thresholds in Japan. We pay attention to exogenous discontinuity and apply an RDD to consider 
an endogeneity bias. 
Bradbury and Crain (2001), Bradbury and Stephenson (2003), and Baqir (2002) reported the 
size of government is positively related to the number of council members. However, their 
research has some empirical problems. 
Most studies apply empirical methods that do not support an identification of causal effects. 
Their estimation results depend on relatively small sample sizes supporting identification. For 
example, because council size changes are relatively infrequent, identification in existing 
empirical results depends on cross-sectional data in council size. We should use panel data 
analysis to address problems of endogeneity bias. 
Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) deal with these problems. 
Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) applied sharp RDD to Germany’s panel data. In German 
municipalities, council size law prescribes council size in relation to the population size. In their 
case, if the population size is less than 1,000, the number of council members must be 8; if the 
population size is more than 1,000 and less than 2,000, the number of members must be 12, and 
so on. There are 13 thresholds for council size in German municipalities. Egger and 
Koethenbuerger (2010) estimated an average treatment effect. They induced pork-barrel 
expenditure by taxes such as profits taxes. Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) estimated the Finland and 
Sweden cases. In Finland, council size law prescribes the council size in relation to the 
population size. If the population size is less than 2,000, the number of council members must be 
17; if the population size is more than 2,000 and less than 4,000, the number of members should 
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be 21, etc. There are nine thresholds like this determining the number of municipalities in 
Finland. Because the number of council members is a deterministic and discontinuous function 
of the population size in Finland, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) used sharp RDD. Furthermore, 
council size law prescribes a minimum requirement of council size in relation to the population 
size in Sweden’s municipalities. If the population size is less than 12,000, the number of council 
members is at least 31; if the population size is more than 12,000 and less than 24,000, the 
number of members is at least 41, and so on. There are four thresholds in Sweden. Because 
council size in Sweden is a discontinuous but not deterministic function of population size, the 
estimation method used is fuzzy RDD. Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) showed evidence for a 
negative effect of council size on government expenditure in both settings. 
Figs. 1, 2, and 3 show the relationships between log expenditure and population size. Note 
that we excluded the expenditure of local councils from total expenditure. These figures also 
show the window size as 5%, 15%, and 30% of the population size, respectively. For example, 
we pick a population size of 5,000 and a window size that is plus or minus 5% around threshold. 
This figure shows that both relationships have a positive correlation. The center line shows the 
cutoff point for population size. On the left side, the regression line shows an expenditure 
average of below 5,000. On the right side, the regression line shows expenditure averages above 
5,000. According to the two regression lines, there is a discrete change of the average value. This 
effect shows that the increase of the number of council members affects local government 
expenditure when the population size exceeds the 5,000 threshold. This jump shows an average 
treatment effect. When the population size of the local government increases by one, local 
government spending increases radically. This phenomenon, the fiscal common-pool problem, 
is caused by the expanding council size. 
4. Estimation model 
We estimate the relationship between the expenditure of the local government and the 
number of council members by the following equation. We apply two types of regression 
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discontinuity design: sharp RDD and fuzzy RDD. RDD depends on quasi-experimental 
evidence. First, we use the sharp RDD model, which considers that the treatment variables are 
nonprobabilistic. The reason is that the upper limit of the Japanese local council size is decided 
by the central government. The estimation model uses sharp RDD as follows. 
                (   )                 (1) 
The dependent variable     is the expenditure of the ith local government at time  . Note that 
we exclude expenditure by local councils from the total expenditure.   is a constant term, and 
        represents the size of      th local council at time t as the treatment variable. We take the 
logarithms of the expenditure and council size of the municipality. In order to obtain a robust 
estimator, the treatment variable is independent of the dependent variable (   ) at the thresholds. 
Therefore, the sharp RDD requires the observable continuous variable called the “Assignment 
Variable” and the discontinuous “Treatment Variable” to estimate the average treatment effect.5 
Because the number of council members in Japan is decided by a discontinuous function with 
the population size, the estimator shows the average changes of expenditure at the thresholds. 
The point of identifying the causal effect of council size on expenditure is to distinguish the 
discontinuous relationship between population size and expenditures by discrete changes in 
council size, from a continuous relationship between population size and expenditures. With the 
discontinuous relationship between population size and council size, RDD indicates natural 
experimental evidence. The causality that we considered is the population size decides the size 
of the local council first, and then the size of the local councils affects the expenditure of the 
local government. 
The assignment variable is represented as  (   ) and uses the size of the municipal 
population. An assignment variable with one linear term as an independent variable is rarely 
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 Assignment variable is also called selection variable, forcing variable and treatment determining variable etc. See 
Imbens and Lemieux (2007) and Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
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used, because the functional form assumptions are very strong. We consider  (   ) as a smooth 
nonlinear function of  . Note that this usually applies until the 4th order polynomial.     denotes 
the control variables. These are the per capita wage, size of the daytime population, and 
proportions of the population under 15 and over 65. We also consider the fixed effect   , and 
time effect   . it  is the error term. 
Second, we also consider the fuzzy RDD. As mentioned earlier, the numbers of council 
members are only an upper limit depending on the size of the population of the municipality. It is 
not always true that all municipalities use upper limits on the number of local council members, 
because the council size law prescribes a maximum limit of council size in relation to the 
population size. This model assumes that the size of the local councils is a probabilistic 
discontinuous variable at the thresholds. Discontinuity is highly correlated with treatment. We 
employ the instrumental variables estimation. As Angrist and Pischke (2008) point out, the 
treatment effect of fuzzy RDD is estimated by IV estimation. We estimate this model with 
population size as an instrumental variable. 
                               (2) 
                         (3) 
The data describe Japanese local government spending from FY2001 to FY2006. However, 
the central government encourages municipal mergers in tandem with work on economic and 
fiscal structural reforms. Through the municipal merger process, known as Heisei-no-Daigappei, 
the number of municipalities in Japan decreased from 3,232 in 1999 to 1,820 in 2006. We avoid 
the effect of municipal mergers in Japan, so we remove merged municipalities from our dataset. 
This leaves us with a remaining dataset of 13,989 Japanese municipalities. We quote the data 
from Annual Accounts of Local Government and the Accounts of Local Government in Japan. 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. The average council size has about 15 
members. 
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5. Estimation results 
We estimate the equations for the full sample, which include every threshold, and the 
equations for the discontinuity sample, which show the window size as 5%, 15%, and 30% of the 
population size, respectively.
6
 In the following two sections, 5.1 and 5.2, we report the results on 
municipal expenditure and debt issues, respectively. We control for the per capita wage, rate of 
the daytime population, rate of the population under 15, rate of the population over 65, and 
population size, because these are considered to be a dataset of control variables in the empirical 
literature on estimates of local government expenditure. In addition, we consider a set of 
time-fixed effects and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors at the municipality level. In all 
estimation results, the coefficient of the council size is positive. These estimation results cover 
various statistical problems that previous research could not deal with. 
5.1 Results on local government expenditure 
The results using the full sample are reported in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) show the results 
of Pooling OLS. Both results show the positive effect of the local council size. Column (1) 
shows that the estimated council size effect on spending is 2.29 without control variables. 
Column (2) shows that the estimated council size effect is 2.01 including control variables. 
Columns (3) and (4) represent the results of fixed effect estimation. Because the “fixed effect” is 
controlled, the estimated value of the local council size is smaller than the result of Pooling OLS 
in columns (1) and (2). 
The result of sharp RDD is reported in columns (5) to (8). The estimated value of council size 
becomes much smaller than previous results. Of note, we consider the effect of assignment 
variables in these estimations. To specify the function of assignment variables, we use from the 
first to fourth degree of the polynomial population size and report the result of the likelihood 
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 Regression results with window size as 5%, 15%, and 30% of population from all thresholds are not reported. 
Detailed results for each window size (5%, 15%, and 30%) are available upon request. 
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ratio test (LR test) for all polynomial terms. While the LR test of between the fourth and third 
degree polynomials is insignificant, the test between the fourth and second degree is significant. 
Similarly, the LR test between the fourth and first degrees is significant. As a result, column (7) 
shows the council size effect is 0.05. 
The estimation results of fuzzy RDD are reported in column (9). We check the specification 
of the model by using the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test. This test shows that the fuzzy RDD 
specification is plausible. The estimated value is positively significant and this result shows that 
if the number of council members is marginally increased, then expenditure will increase.
7
 In 
other words, the increase of the local council size leads to about a 1.23% increase of expenditure 
by municipalities. Conclusively, the positive council size effect is supported by evidence from 
fuzzy RDD. 
As a robustness check, we also consider the local effect of the number of local council 
members. It is necessary to check what happens in each threshold. “Using data only within a 
window size around threshold indicates the advantage that misspecification of the functional 
form of the polynomial is less likely than when using all data” (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009; 
Egger and Koethenbuerger, 2010). The result of the discontinuity sample whose threshold is 
10,000 is reported in Table 4. We set the window size as 30% of the population size. We show 
the results of Pooling OLS (columns 1 and 2), fixed effect estimation (columns 5, 6, 7, and 8), 
and instrumental variable estimation (column 9). The coefficient of all council sizes is positive 
and significant. According to the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test, the fuzzy RDD estimation is 
plausible. Column (9) shows that the estimated value council size is 1.26. 
Table 5 shows that the threshold is 20,000. We also set the window size at a 30% of cutoff 
population. These results are similar to previous results and the fuzzy RDD (column 9) is the 
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 The over-identification test shows that the one powered population is a more plausible instrumental variable than the 
second degree of the polynomial population in fuzzy RDD estimation. 
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most plausible. The estimated value of the size of the local councils is 1.778. As a result, the 
discontinuity sample shows similar findings to the full sample estimation model. 
As another robustness check, Table 6 shows municipal expenditure categories (office, 
welfare, sanitation, agriculture, forestry and fishery, commerce and industry, civil engineering 
work, fire, and education) results by Fuzzy RDD.
8
 The positive relationship between council 
size and expenditures has a consistent statistically significant effect on all categories.
9
 Especially, 
increasing the council size leads to large spending increases of 2.05% for agriculture, forestry, 
and fishery expenditures, 2.40% for civil engineering work expenditures, 1.86% for welfare 
expenditures, and 1.59% for commerce and industry expenditures. It is noteworthy that the 
coefficient of the expenditure categories is large in related public projects such as agriculture, 
forestry, and fishery work, as well as civil engineering work, and welfare work. 
5.2 Results on local government debt 
With respect to the revenue side, we also focus on new issues of local government debt. If the 
expansion of the council size increases the number of new public projects, these projects are 
accompanied by an additional increase of municipal expenditure. The local government will 
borrow more to cover its expenditures, which will increase the public debt. However, the 
municipalities prefer to externalize the expenditure on public projects financed by debt. This 
section examines the possibility of the fiscal common-pool problem from the aspect of 
municipal debt. We use municipal debt issues of each fiscal year as the dependent variable. Figs. 
4, 5, and 6 show the relationship between logs of new issues of debt and population size. These 
figures also show window sizes as 5%, 15%, and 30% of the population size, respectively. For 
example, we pick a population size of 10,000 and a window size plus or minus 30% around the 
threshold. This figure shows relationships with positive correlations. According to two 
regression lines, there is a discrete change in average values. This effect shows that the increase 
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 Our estimation model excludes labor expenditure for many missing values.  
9
 On the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the fuzzy RDD estimation is plausible on all expenditures categories. 
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of the number of council members affects the local government debt issues when the population 
size is over the 10,000 threshold. When one person in local government increases, the total debt 
of the local government increases. These jumps indicate that the municipalities cover 
expenditures on new public projects by new debt issues. This phenomenon, also called the fiscal 
common-pool problem, is caused by the expansion of the council size. 
The results from the full sample are reported in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) show the results 
of Pooling OLS. Both results show the positive effects of local council size. Moreover, columns 
(3) and (4) represent the results of the fixed effect estimation. The estimated value of local 
council size is smaller than in the result of Pooling OLS in columns (1) and (2), as is also the case 
with Table 3. The results of sharp RDD are reported in columns (5) to (8). The estimated council 
size becomes much smaller than in previous results. As previously explained, we consider the 
effects of assignment variables in these estimations. The LR test between the fourth and third 
degrees is insignificant, as also are the tests between the fourth and second degrees. However, 
the LR test between the fourth and first degree is significant. As a result, column (6) shows that 
the council size effect is 0.11. 
The estimation results of fuzzy RDD are reported in column (9). The Durbin–Wu–Hausman 
test shows that the fuzzy RDD specification is plausible at the 1% level. As in previous results, 
the positive council size effect is supported by evidence from the fuzzy RDD. Like the 
expenditure results, the estimated value is positively significant, and this shows that if the 
number of council members is marginally increased, then the expenditure will increase, as is the 
case shown in Table 3. Furthermore, the increase of local council size leads to about a 2.62% 
increase of municipality debt. The council effect on debt is larger than in expenditure cases. 
In addition, we consider the local effect of the number of local council members. The results 
of the discontinuity samples whose thresholds are 10,000 and 20,000 are reported in Table 8 and 
Table 9, respectively. We show the results of Pooling OLS (columns 1 and 2), fixed effect 
estimation (columns 5, 6, 7, and 8) and instrumental variable estimation (column 9). The 
coefficient on all council sizes is positive and significant. While column (9) shows that the 
14 
 
estimated value of council size is 5.62 in Table 8, column (9) results on council size effect are 
insignificant in Table 9. However, the discontinuity sample of debt also shows similar findings 
to the full sample estimation model and expenditure cases. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we apply the regression discontinuity design to estimate the fiscal 
common-pool problem in Japanese local public finance. Because the number of members of 
Japanese local councils is decided by a discontinuous function of population size, we are able to 
avoid the endogenous problem. In other words, the effect of council size on local expenditure is 
considered exogenous. 
Our results from the full sample show that the increase of the number of council members 
causes increasing expenditure by local government. This result supports the results of Egger and 
Koethenbuerger (2010). Our results from the discontinuity sample show that the average 
treatment has a positive effect on the expenditure around the thresholds of 10,000 and 20,000. 
Especially, these results imply that relatively smaller governments face the fiscal common-pool 
problem in Japanese local government. Moreover, we show that Japanese municipalities 
increase debt issues in response to an expansion of council size. Our results also indicate that 
council members have the potential to obtain pork-barrel expenditures by issuance of new debt. 
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Fig. 1. Log expenditure and population around a threshold window of 5%. 
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Fig. 2. Log expenditure and population around a threshold window of 15%. 
 
  
ln
(E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
)
pop
2000
ln
(E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
)
pop
5000
ln
(E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
)
pop
10000
ln
(E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
)
pop
20000
ln
(E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
)
pop
50000
ln
(E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
)
pop
100000
ln
(E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
)
pop
200000
ln
(E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
)
pop
300000
ln
(E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
)
pop
500000
ln
(E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
)
pop
900000
 Note:Window size 15% 
19 
 
Fig. 3. Log expenditure and population around a threshold window of 30%. 
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Fig. 4. Log debt and population around a threshold window of 5%. 
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Fig. 5. Log debt and population around a threshold window of 15%. 
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Fig. 6. Log debt and population around a threshold window of 30%. 
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Table 1 
Local council-size law: Japanese municipalities. 
 
  
Population size Number of council members Population size Number of council members
         ~50,000 26 ~2,000 12
50,000 ~100,000 30 2,000~5,000 14
100,000 ~200,000 34 5,000~10,000 18
200,000~300,000 38 10,000~20,000 22
300,000~500,000 46 20,000~ 26
500,000~900,000 56
900,000~ 56~96
City Town and village
24 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
 
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Expenditure(thousand yen) 15700000.00 64800000.00 605945.00 1850000000.00
  Office Expenditure 1877122.00 5053756.00 113621.00 135000000.00
  Welfare Expenditure 3736155.00 17000000.00 65058.00 526000000.00
  Sanitation Expenditure 1479320.00 5574664.00 19189.00 177000000.00
  Agriculture, forestry, and fishery Expenditure 563577.60 650227.90 94.00 24900000.00
  Commerce and Industry Expenditure 590142.10 4508100.00 86.00 134000000.00
  Civil engineering work Expenditure 2756848.00 14100000.00 11291.00 472000000.00
  Fire work Expenditure 571077.60 1830841.00 4495.00 46500000.00
  Education Expenditure 1809353.00 6330626.00 37375.00 194000000.00
Debt 1696603.00 7601303.00 0.00 251000000.00
Council size 15.96 7.29 4.00 93.00
Population size 40840.70 139679.70 211.00 3562983.00
Per capita wage 6007.91 661.83 2496.07 10368.99
Rate of daytime population 0.94 0.24 0.57 22.59
Rate of population under 15 0.14 0.03 0.05 2.86
Rate of population over 65 0.24 0.09 0.07 6.33
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Table 3 Estimation results (full sample). 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. The degree of freedom of 
the Hausman, LR, and Durbin–Wu–Hausman tests are also in parentheses 
Dependent var. ln(Expenditure) Fuzzy RDD
Indepnedent var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment variable 2.287*** 2.012*** 0.294*** 0.077*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 1.229***
      ln(Council size) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.101)
Assignment variables
     ln(pop) 0.966*** 2.337*** 11.307*** 12.134*
(0.060) (0.357) (1.721) (6.947)
     ln(pop)*2 -0.077*** -1.088*** -1.224
(0.020) (0.191) (1.123)
     ln(pop)*3 0.037*** 0.047
(0.007) (0.080)
     ln(pop)*4 -0.000
(0.002)
Controls
    ln(per capita wage) 0.965*** -0.167*** -0.172*** -0.171*** -0.170*** -0.170*** 0.094***
(0.035) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.036)
    Rate of daytime pupulation 0.826*** -0.006 -0.092* -0.109** -0.099** -0.099** 0.108
(0.026) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.069)
    Rate of population under 15 -3.173*** 1.883*** 0.531** 0.604** 0.588** 0.588** 0.875***
(0.146) (0.234) (0.246) (0.247) (0.246) (0.247) (0.332)
    Rate of population over 65 -1.532*** -0.821*** 0.111 0.137 0.110 0.110 -0.786***
(0.058) (0.152) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.208)
  2002 Dummy 0.042*** -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 0.007*
(0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
  2003 Dummy 0.090*** -0.032*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 0.030***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
  2004 Dummy 0.068*** -0.064*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 0.010
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
  2005 Dummy 0.126*** -0.056*** -0.082*** -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.083*** 0.042***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
  2006 Dummy 0.243*** -0.073*** -0.095*** -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.097*** 0.098***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017)
Constant 9.592*** 1.928*** 14.960*** 16.961*** 7.931*** 1.929 -23.961*** -25.807 11.567***
(0.026) (0.294) (0.029) (0.185) (0.594) (1.652) (5.131) (15.884) (0.532)
Sample size 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989
R-squared 0.805 0.836 0.064 0.176 0.195 0.196 0.198 0.198
F stat 57666 7142 740.8 230.2 237.4 219.1 205.0 190.3
Degree of polynomial in pop size None None None None First Second Third Fourth First
Likelihood-ratio Test LR chi2(3) LR chi2(2) LR chi2(1)
=56.49*** = 36.83***   = 0.02
Hausman Test chi2(10)  chi2(11) chi2(12) chi2(12) chi2(7)
=-355.78 =629.30*** =-1482.48 = -94.98 =577.79***
chi2(10)
((9) Durbin-Wu-Hausman test) = 131.56***
Pooling OLS Fixed Effect Sharp RDD
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Table 4 
Estimation results (discontinuity sample: 10,000, 30%). 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. The control variables are per 
capita wage, rate of daytime population, rate of population under 15, rate of population over 65, and year dummies. The results of control variables are not reported. 
  
Dependent var. ln(Expenditure) Fuzzy RDD
Indepnedent var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment variable 0.738*** 0.624*** 0.327*** 0.0933*** 0.0856*** 0.0859*** 0.0862*** 0.0861*** 1.257***
      ln(Council size) (22.68) (18.97) (9.849) (3.366) (3.161) (3.188) (3.198) (3.196) (2.608)
Assignment variables
     ln(pop) 0.751*** 12.59* -191.4 610.6
(3.186) (1.874) (-0.417) (0.289)
     ln(pop)*2 -0.649* 21.63 -110.7
(-1.766) (0.431) (-0.320)
     ln(pop)*3 -0.811 8.890
(-0.444) (0.351)
     ln(pop)*4 -0.267
(-0.381)
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 3,100 3,100 3,100 3,100 3,100 3,100 3,100 3,100 3,073
R-squared 0.183 0.297 0.083 0.209 0.214 0.215 0.215 0.215
Degree of polynomial in pop size No No No No First Second Third Fourth First
Pooling OLS Fixed Effect Sharp RDD
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Table 5 
Estimation results (discontinuity sample: 20,000, 30%). 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. The control variables are per 
capita wage, rate of daytime population, rate of population under 15, rate of population over 65, and year are dummies. The results of control variables are not reported. 
  
Dependent var. ln(Expenditure) Fuzzy RDD
Indepnedent var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment variable 0.518*** 0.427*** 0.247*** 0.0401 0.0335 0.0331 0.0330 0.0331 1.778*
      ln(Council size) (13.48) (10.92) (6.610) (1.182) (1.012) (1.001) (1.000) (1.002) (1.716)
Assignment variables
     ln(pop) 0.758*** 5.930 570.4 1,674
(3.395) (0.494) (0.713) (0.836)
     ln(pop)*2 -0.264 -57.70 -229.0
(-0.430) (-0.708) (-0.768)
     ln(pop)*3 1.948 13.76
(0.703) (0.685)
     ln(pop)*4 -0.306
(-0.590)
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1,993 1993 1,993 1,993 1,993 1,993 1,993 1993 1,976
R-squared 0.122 0.197 0.054 0.204 0.211 0.211 0.212 0.212
Degree of polynomial in pop size No No No No First Second Third Fourth First
Pooling OLS Fixed Effect Sharp RDD
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Table 6 
Estimation results: municipal expenditure categories (full sample). 
 
Note: Variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. The control variables are per capita wage, rate of daytime population, rate of population 
under 15, rate of population over 65, and year dummies. The results of control variables are not reported. 
  
Dependent var. ln(Office) ln(Welfare) ln(Sanitation)
ln(Agriculture,
forestry, and
fishery)
ln(Commerce
and Industry)
ln(Civil
engineering
work)
ln(Fire) ln(Education)
Indepnedent var.
Treatment variable 0.585*** 1.855*** 0.483*** 2.053*** 1.593*** 2.403*** 1.056*** 1.578***
      ln(Council size) (0.163) (0.145) (0.150) (0.238) (0.316) (0.244) (0.124) (0.229)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989 13,989
Degree of polynomial in pop size First First First First First First First First
Fuzzy RDD
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Table 7 
Estimation results: debt (full sample). 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. The degree of freedom of 
the Hausman, LR, and Durbin–Wu–Hausman tests are also in parentheses. 
Dependent var. ln(Debt) Fuzzy RDD
Indepnedent var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment variable 2.054*** 2.027*** 0.559*** 0.174*** 0.109** 0.110** 0.110** 0.108** 2.623***
      ln(Council size) (0.014) (0.019) (0.044) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.322)
Assignment variables 2.069*** 7.963*** 13.771** -1.035
     ln(pop) (0.238) (1.406) (6.783) (27.255)
-0.329*** -0.985 1.450
     ln(pop)*2 (0.077) (0.753) (4.406)
0.024 -0.150
     ln(pop)*3 (0.028) (0.312)
0.005
     ln(pop)*4 (0.008)
Controls
    ln(per capita wage) 0.620*** -0.685*** -0.694*** -0.690*** -0.689*** -0.688*** -0.126
(0.055) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.115)
    Rate of daytime pupulation 0.381*** -0.316 -0.526*** -0.596*** -0.588*** -0.588*** -0.052
(0.043) (0.202) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.229)
    Rate of population under 15 -2.927*** 3.654*** 0.788 1.097 1.081 1.086 1.480
(0.238) (0.923) (0.977) (0.979) (0.979) (0.979) (1.074)
    Rate of population over 65 0.111 -0.551 1.519** 1.638** 1.618** 1.614** -0.542
(0.095) (0.609) (0.652) (0.652) (0.652) (0.653) (0.684)
  2002 Dummy 0.199*** 0.134*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.199***
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014)
  2003 Dummy 0.439*** 0.316*** 0.336*** 0.341*** 0.340*** 0.340*** 0.449***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021)
  2004 Dummy 0.207*** 0.095*** 0.127*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.254***
(0.017) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024)
  2005 Dummy 0.023 -0.058** -0.115*** -0.104*** -0.107*** -0.106*** 0.152***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.039)
  2006 Dummy 0.036* -0.178*** -0.226*** -0.213*** -0.216*** -0.216*** 0.189***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.056)
Constant 7.982*** 2.521*** 12.008*** 18.811*** -0.557 -26.328*** -43.070** -10.002 7.298***
(0.039) (0.464) (0.118) (0.720) (2.345) (6.496) (20.204) (62.325) (1.701)
Sample size 13,950 13,950 13,950 13,950 13,950 13,950 13,950 13,950 13,950
R-squared 0.595 0.627 0.015 0.207 0.212 0.214 0.214 0.214
F stat 20489 2347 161.7 280.2 263.3 243.3 224.6 208.6
Degree of polynomial in pop size None None None None First Second Third Fourth First
Likelihood-ratio Test  LR chi2(3)  LR chi2(2) LR chi2(1)
=24.88*** =1.40 =0.41
Hausman Test chi2(10) chi2(11) chi2(12) chi2(9)  chi2(8)
=1401.49*** =118.45*** =184.64*** =175.66*** =168.40***
chi2(10)
((9) Durbin-Wu-Hausman test) =58.89***
Pooling OLS Fixed Effect Sharp RDD
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Table 8 
Estimation results: debt (discontinuity sample: 10,000, 30%). 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. The control variables are per 
capita wage, rate of daytime population, rate of population under 15, rate of population over 65, and year are dummies. The results of control variables are not reported. 
  
Dependent var. ln(Debt) Fuzzy RDD
Indepnedent var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment variable 0.724*** 0.956*** 0.488*** 0.221** 0.193* 0.196* 0.196* 0.197* 5.628**
      ln(Council size) (10.95) (14.19) (4.513) (2.046) (1.808) (1.854) (1.855) (1.869) (2.334)
Assignment variables
     ln(pop) 3.200*** 71.49** -386.3 -12,666
(2.970) (2.523) (-0.202) (-1.405)
     ln(pop)*2 -3.743** 46.28 2,074
(-2.417) (0.221) (1.418)
     ln(pop)*3 -1.821 -150.6
(-0.239) (-1.422)
     ln(pop)*4 4.092
(1.416)
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 3,085 3,085 3,085 3,085 3,085 3,085 3,085 3,085 3,057
R-squared 0.230 0.061 0.011 0.228 0.233 0.235 0.235 0.236
Degree of polynomial in pop size No No No No First Second Third Fourth First
Pooling OLS Fixed Effect Sharp RDD
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Table 9 
Estimation results: debt (discontinuity sample: 20,000, 30%). 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. The control variables are per 
capita wage, rate of daytime population, rate of population under 15, rate of population over 65, and year are dummies. The results of control variables are not reported. 
Dependent var. ln(Debt) Fuzzy RDD
Indepnedent var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment variable 0.832*** 0.691*** 0.367** 0.266* 0.251 0.248 0.247 0.245 4.596
      ln(Council size) (9.236) (7.947) (2.407) (1.725) (1.637) (1.624) (1.623) (1.616) (1.299)
Assignment variables
     ln(pop) 1.850 36.06 2,376 -16,276*
(1.400) (0.549) (0.635) (-1.786)
     ln(pop)*2 -1.748 -239.8 2,657*
(-0.517) (-0.631) (1.937)
     ln(pop)*3 8.074 -191.8**
(0.626) (-2.050)
     ln(pop)*4 5.168**
(2.120)
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1,991 1,991 1,991 1,991 1,991 1,991 1,991 1,991 1,974
R-squared 0.051 0.183 0.005 0.233 0.235 0.235 0.236 0.238
Degree of polynomial in pop size No No No No First Second Third Fourth First
Pooling OLS Fixed Effect Sharp RDD
